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Article 4

Drafting a Limited Liability Clause that Will Pass the
Scrutiny of the Utah Courts*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Limited liability clauses contractually limit a party's liability. Thfs
comment will address four types of limited liability clauses: releases,
exculpatory clauses, indemnity clauses, and limitation of damages
clauses.
A release is a clause liberating one party from any liability to the
other party in a contract. This type of clause is often found in standard
form contracts, such as rental agreements between a ski-renter and a
skier. An exculpatory clause is similar to a release, except that it is often
created between two parties that have entered into a uniquely drafted
contract bargained for at arms length. These are common in construction
or service contracts. The third type of clause, an indemnity clause, is
used when a party promises to protect another from third party liability.
Finally, a limitation of damages clause fixes a maximum amount an
injured party may recover, regardless of the amount of damages the party
can prove. 1
Traditionally, limited liability clauses have not been favored by Utah
courts. 2 This comment will first discuss the common-law rule regarding
the validity of these clauses. Second, it will discuss the history
underlying the use of limited liability clauses in Utah, focusing on the
standards set forth by the courts over the past half-century. Finally, it
will explore how a legal practitioner can draft a clause that will pass the
scrutiny of Utah courts.
II.

THE COMMON-LAW RULE

Under the common-law majority rule, limited liability clauses are
valid unless they go against public policy in the narrow circumstances of

* Copyright <C> 1996 Trey Dayes. These concepts were originally compiled in a memo
on how to defeat limited liability clauses in Utah and Wyoming written by Trey Dayes and
edited by Shawn Gunnerson for the law firm of Walstad & Babcock, Provo, Utah. They are
used with the firm's consent.
1. 5 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS§ 1068 (1964).
2. Union Pacific R.R. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 408 P.2d 910, 913 (Utah 1965).
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an employer-employee relationship or where one is "charged with a duty
of public service . . . . " 3 This rule applies to releases, exculpatory,
indemnity, and limitation of damages clauses equally. 4
III.

JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF LIMITED LIABILITY CLAUSES IN UTAH

Utah courts have interpreted limited liability clauses inconsistently,
occasionally applying different standards to clauses containing nearly
identical language. This section will review Utah case law addressing
indemnity clauses, exculpatory clauses, and limitation of damage clauses.
Additionally it will explore how limited liability clauses are treated in the
federal courts, and the special exceptions that apply.
A.
1.

El Paso and Freund

El Paso: The Clear Expression Standard

The Utah Supreme Court outlined Utah's original rule for indemnity
clauses in a 1965 case called Union Pacific Railroad v. El Paso Natural
Gas Company. 5 In this case, Union Pacific paid damages to one of El
Paso's employees who was struck by Union Pacific's train. 6 Union
Pacific later sought payment from El Paso under an indemnity provision
between the two. The provision stated that El Paso "would indemnify
and hold the Union Pacific harmless ... from and against any and all
liability, loss, damage, claims, ... of whatsoever nature. " 7 The court
held the clause invalid, stating that "[t]he majority rule appears to be that
in most situations, where such is the desire of the parties, and it is clearly
understood and expressed, such a covenant will be upheld. " 8 Thus,
while the court followed the common-law majority rule, 9 it added a new
requirement that the clause be "clearly understood and expressed."
Twelve years later, in a 1977 case called Union Pacific Railroad v.
Intermountain Farmers, 10 the court followed El Paso clear-expression
standard to invalidate a clause which stated that the "[l]essee shall at all
times protect the Lessor and the leased premises from all injury, damage

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id.
Id.
408 P.2d 910 (Utah 1965).
ld. at 911.
Id. at 912 (alterations in original).
Id. at 914.
See supra Part II.
568 P.2d 724 (Utah 1977).
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or loss. " 11 The court cited El Paso and stated that clear intention "is
not achieved by inference from general language." 12
In the 1983 case of Shell Oil Co. v. Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling
Co. , 13 the court again cited the El Paso standard when it upheld an
indemnity clause that was similar to the clause invalidated in El Paso.
The clause at issue stated that "Contractor [Brinkerhoff] agrees to protect,
indemnify and save Operator [Shell], its employees, and agents harmless
from and against all claims, demands, and causes of action of every kind
and character." 14 In its holding, the court looked to the El Paso clear
expression standard, stating that "[t]he indemnity provision challenged
here meets [the El Paso] requirement, and is upheld under those authorities." 15
2.

Freund: The Negligence Standard

In 1991 the Utah Supreme Court introduced a modified El Paso
standard when it decided Freund v. Utah Power & Light Co. 16 In
Freund, the court upheld an indemnity clause which said that "Licensee
[Jones] shall indemnify, protect, and save harmless Licensor [UP & L]
from and against any and all claims demands, causes of action, costs or
other liabilities," 17 stating that "[i]n a long line of cases spanning more
than fifty years, we have repeatedly held that an indemnity agreement

11. /d. at 724-25.
12. /d. at 726.
13. 658 P.2d 1187, 1189 n.1 (Utah 1983).
14. /d. at 1189 n.l.
15. /d. at 1189. In spite of the court's holding, however, an argument can be made that
Shell Oil actually clouded the El Paso standard in two ways. First, the Shell Oil court claimed
to use the same rule as El Paso, but arrived at the opposite result. Though the words of the
two clauses were not identical, their effect was similar. The clause in El Paso said that
defendant would indemnify and hold the Union Pacific harmless "from and against any and all
liability, loss, damage, claims, ... of whatsoever nature." Union Pacific R.R. v. El Paso
Natural Gas Co., 408 P.2d 910, 912 (Utah 1965)(alteration in original). Similarly, the clause
in Shell Oil says, "[c]ontractor [Brinkerhoff] agrees to protect, indemnify and save Operator
[Shell]. its employees, and agents harmless from and against all claims, demands and causes
of action of every kind and character." Shell Oil, 658 P.2d at 1198 n.1.
Second, the court's dicta in Shell Oil stated that "[i]ndeed, the contention that contracts
of indemnity violate public policy by inducing negligence has been rejected by more that one
court as 'fanciful' or 'untenable' in view of the many automobile liability insurance policies in
existence." /d. at 1189. The court left unanswered the question of whether Utah still "does
not look with favor" upon these clauses. See El Paso, 408 P.2d at 913.
16. 793 P.2d 362 (Utah 1990).
17. /d. at 371. This clause was similar to the El Paso clause which said "that the defendant would indemnify and hold the Union Pacific harmless ... from and against any and all
liability, loss, damage, claims, ... of whatsoever nature." El Paso, 408 P.2d at 912 (alterations in original).
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which purports to make a party respond for the negligence of another
should be strictly construed." 18
The court noted that "there is a growing trend to relax some of the
strictness of the rule of construction when the indemnity arises in a
commercial context. " 19 Additionally, the court continued, "it is not
necessary that the exculpatory language refers expressly to the negligence
of the indemnitee, so long as the intention to indemnify can be 'clearly
implied from the language and purposes of the entire agreement, and the
surrounding facts and circumstances. "' 20 This new twist on El Paso
implies that word 'negligence' effectively shows clear intent. 21
3.

Cases After Freund

The El Paso rule requires that the clause be very specific; indeed,
intent must be "clearly and unequivocally expressed. " 22 Freund relaxes
that rule in commercial settings. In Freund, intent or the word negligence can be implied "from the language and purposes of the entire
agreement, and the surrounding facts and circumstances. " 23
Though Freund arguably set forth a new standard regarding
indemnification clauses in commercial settings, few courts followed it.
For example, in Gordon v. CRS Consulting Engineers, Inc. 24 the Utah
Court of Appeals found that a clause indemnifying the State by a
construction company did not cover the engineering company hired by the

18. Freund, 793 P.2d at 370 (citing Shell Oil Co. v. Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling Co.,
658 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Utah 1983)); See also Union Pacific R.R. v. Intermountain Farmers
Ass'n, 568 P.2d 724, 725-26 (Utah 1977); Howe Rents Corp. v. Worthen, 420 P.2d 848, 849
(Utah 1966); Union Pacific R.R. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 408 P.2d 910, 913-14 (Utah
1965); Barrus v. Wilkinson, 398 P.2d 207, 208 (Utah 1965); Walker Bank & Trust Co. v.
First Security Corp., 341 P.2d 944, 947 (Utah (1959); Jankele v. Texas Co., 54 P.2d 425
(Utah 1936).
19. Freund, 793 P.2d at 370.
20. /d.
21. Two things can be inferred from Freund. First, a new rule exists for indemnity
clauses in commercial transactions bargained for at arm's length; namely, that intent "can be
'clearly implied from the language and purposes of the entire agreement, and the surrounding
facts and circumstances."' Second, for a clause to meet the clear and unequivocal expression
test of El Paso, the word 'negligence' should appear in the clause.
Reviewing El Paso and Intermountain Farmers, the word negligence is not in their clauses.
See El Paso, 408 P.2d 910; Union Pacific R.R. v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n, 568 P.2d 724
(Utah 1977). Perhaps this was why they were found invalid. Conversely, in Shell Oil the
clause does say "except where such injury, death or damage has resulted from the sole
negligence of Operator." Shell Oil, 658 P.2d at 1189. Thus, inclusion of negligence is more
clear in the Shell Oil case than in the El Paso and Intermountain Farmers, allowing this clause
to pass the El Paso rule.
22. Union Pacific R.R. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 408 P.2d 910, 914. (Utah 1965).
23. Freund v. Utah Power and Light Co., 793 P.2d 362, 370 (Utah 1990).
24. 820 P.2d 492 (Utah App. 1991).

51]

LIMITED LIABILITY CLAUSES

55

State as an independent contractor. In construing the clause, the Court
of Appeals cited El Paso25 but made no reference to Freund, even
though Freund could easily have been applied. 26
Two years later the court of appeals again ignored Freund in favor
of El Paso.
In Scudder v. Kennecott Copper Corporation 27 two
commercial entities entered into a contract where Weyher-Livsey, the
contractor, was to indemnify Kennecott, the owner. Although Freund
was cited as the controlling authority of the case, the court looked to El
Paso to hold that the clause was valid. Following the El Paso holding,
the court declared that:
The law is clear that indemnification agreements should be strictly
construed against the drafter. The reason an indemnification agreement
is strictly construed "seems to have arisen primarily to appease the
concern that one who is not financially responsible for the consequences
of his or her own negligence will be less careful in his or her behavior
toward others." "A party is contractually obligated to assume ultimate
financial responsibility for the negligence of another only when that
intention is 'clearly and unequivocally expressed.'" The presumption
is against assuming financial responsibility for the negligence of another
and "it is not achieved by inference or implication from the general
language. " 28
The court ignored the language in the Freund case stating that this
standard has been relaxed in commercial situations and a court can imply
the negligence language "from the purpose of the entire agreement, and
the surrounding facts and circumstances. " 29 However, the proper result
was still achieved because the clause passes the stricter El Paso rule. The
court stated:
This indemnification agreement, while somewhat convoluted, is
less equivocal than the indemnification agreement in Freund because it
specifically requires Weyher-Livsey to indemnify Stearns for losses and
expenses incurred by reason "of negligence or any other grounds of
legal liability . . . on the part of [Weyher-Livsey, Kennecott, or

25. !d. at 494.
26. Under Freund, the clause would still have been invalidated because the "surrounding
facts and circumstances" indicated that the clause did not extend to the engineer. Freund, 793
P.2d at 370. Thus the court reached the proper result without applying the proper rule.
However, the court's analysis leaves some question as to when El Paso applies and when
Freund applies.
27. 858 P.2d 1005 (Utah App. 1993), rev'd, 886 P.2d 49 (Utah 1994)(reversing on
grounds unrelated to the indemnification agreement).
28. !d. at 1008 (citations omitted).
29. Freund v. Utah Power and Light Co., 793 P.2d 362, 370 (Utah 1990).
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Stearns]." We conclude therefore that this agreement expresses a clear

and unequivocal intent. 30

This is clearly the El Paso standard instead of the Freund standard.
The recent case of Ericksen v. Salt Lake City Corp., 31 did little to
resolve the question concerning which standard should apply. In fact, the
Utah Supreme Court only added to the confusion with this case. In
Ericksen, a contractor agreed to indemnify the City of Salt Lake. The
Court invalidated the indemnity clause, but failed to mention whether
Freund or El Paso should apply. The court compared the Ericksen
indemnity clause to the clause found valid in Freund, stating that in
Freund, "the contract of indemnity was much broader in its sweep than
what we find in the instant case. " 32
This "broader in sweep" language is confusing because there has
never been a requirement that the language be "broader in its sweep" 33
as the court in Ericksen suggests. That certainly was not in the analysis
of the Freund decision. Thus, it is unclear whether the court was
misapplying Freund or if it was introducing a new rule for indemnity
clauses. 34
B.

Exculpatory Clauses

Under the common-law majority rule, all clauses limiting liability
should be treated in the same way. In Utah, however, this may not be
so, considering that early Utah cases invalidated exculpatory clauses.
The invalidation rule was first laid down in Jankele v. Texas Co. 35 In
Jankele, the defendant's agent improperly installed a leaky gas tank on
the plaintiff's land causing him to lose money. The defendant claimed
that the exculpatory clause protected him from liability. The court held
the clause invalid, stating:
It is very doubtful that defendant could relieve itself by contract
from its own negligence. Ordinarily such contracts are contrary to
public policy. "Undoubtedly contracts exempting persons from liability
for negligence induce a want of care, for the highest incentive to the
exercise of due care rests in a consciousness that a failure in this respect
will fix liability to make full compensation for any injury resulting from

30. Scudder, 858 P.2d at 1009 (emphasis added).
31. 858 P.2d 995 (Utah 1993).
32. /d. at 998.
33. Ericksen, 858 P.2d at 998.
34. It is important to note that reference to negligence is not explicitly stated in the
clause. /d. Thus, the clause would also have be invalidated under the El Paso rule, but maybe
not under the Freund rule.
35. 54 P.2d 425 (Utah 1936).
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the cause. It has therefore been declared to be good doctrine that no
person may contract against his own negligence. " 36

Thus, exculpatory clauses were void under Utah law because they were
against public policy. 37
Twenty-three years after Jankle, the Utah Supreme Court handed
down a decision in Vtblker Bank & Trust v. First Security Corp. 38 that
reversed ]ankle and permitted companies to use exculpatory clauses. In
Vtblker Bank, the guardian of beneficiaries of a lapsed life insurance
policy brought suit "because of [the] bank's failure to pay premiums" 39
as it had a duty to do. The contract between the bank and the trustor had
a "hold harmless" provision where the bank assumed "no liability
whatsoever in the premises, and [the trustor] further agree[d] to hold [the
bank] harmless of and from any and all claims arising [t]hereunder. " 40
The court invalidated the clause using a rule very similar to the El Paso
rule, stating:
[O]ne may contract to protect himself against liability for loss
caused by his negligence, it is nevertheless well settled that contracts in
which a party attempts to do so are subject to strict construction against
him; and further, that he will be afforded no protection unless the
preclusion against the negligence is clearly and unequivocally stated. 41

36. /d. at 427 (citing 6 R.C.L § 132, p. 727).
37. This differs from the original indemnity rule (El Paso) which generally allowed
indemnity clauses if they were clearly and unequivocally expressed.
The American Law Reports recognized Utah as one of the minority states that in dicta has
"unqualifiedly laid down" the rule that "one cannot avoid liability for negligence by contract."
K.A. Drechsler, Annotation, Limiting Liability for Own Negligence, 175 A.L.R. 8, 14 (1927).
The language is arguably not dicta because the court did invalidate the clause as void as against
public policy. Even so, the American Law Report makes it clear that this was the rule in Utah.
Later cases, such as Allen v. Southern Pac. Co., 213 P.2d 667 (Utah 1950), also support
the proposition that exculpatory clauses are void as against public policy. In Allen, the plaintiff
"brought [an] action against the Southern Pacific Company to recover $2,190 for (a] traveling
bag and contents which were lost from defendant's checkroom in [the] railroad station." /d.
The court held that "[t]he great weight of authority is that a bailee cannot entirely exempt
himself by contract from liability due to his negligence and contracts limiting his liability for
negligence during the course of a general business with the public are usually regarded as being
against public policy." /d. at 668 (See, 6 AM. JUR. Bailments § 176). The court did not cite
Jankele, so this case can be read two ways. First, it could be read as following Jankele, that
exculpatory clauses are void as against public policy. Second, in could be read very narrowly
to say that exculpatory clauses are only void in the bailee/bailor situation. Given these two
readings of the case, it really does not help a practitioner understand whether exculpatory
clauses are void as against public policy in Utah.
38. 341 P.2d 944 (Utah 1959).
39. /d.
40. /d.at947.
41. /d. at 947 (emphasis added).
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Thus, exculpatory clauses, like indemnity clauses, 42 must be clearly
stated. 43
Nineteen years after V'.blker, the Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed that
the El Paso clear-expression standard applies to exculpatory clauses. In
DuBois v. Nye, 44 vendors brought an action against the purchasers to
recover for fire damage caused by the purchasers the day before the
house was conveyed. The purchasers claimed that a clause in the sales
contract exculpated them from their own negligence. The court cited El
Paso, stating "[t]he broad language as to the 'risk of loss' cannot be
construed as a clear, unequivocal expression that is intended to include
loss due to the negligent or intentional wrongful conduct of either
party. " 45 Thus, it appears that El Paso is the rule for exculpatory clause
cases. 46

C.

Limitation of Damages Clauses

Limitation of damages clauses limit the amount of damages an
injured party may receive. The standard for this type of clause is
outlined in a 1983 case DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co. 47 In DCR, a
burglar alarm company claimed that the damages it must pay for a faulty
alarm system were limited. 48 The clause in question read as follows:
"[L]iability hereunder shall be limited to a fixed sum of $50.00, as
liquidated damages, and not as a penalty, and this liability shall be exclu-

42. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
43. In Howe Rents Corp. v Worthen, 420 P.2d 848 (Utah 1966), the Utah Supreme Court
added confusion to exculpatory clause law. The case is similar to Walker Bank but it is
between a bailor and bailee. ld. No reference is made to Allen which is also factually similar.
Instead the court cites El Paso and the indemnity line of case as the rule. After Howe Rents
and Walker Bank, one could infer that the indemnity's clear and unequivocal rule from El Paso
applies to exculpatory clauses.
In Boise Cascade Corp. v. Stephens, 572 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1977), which came after Howe
Rents, the court adding dicta in a concurring opinion. This case addressed waiver of a
materialman's lien and did not directly address exculpatory clauses. The concurring opinion
makes the point that a subcontractor cannot waive his lien "the same as the court would
ordinarily refuse to enforce a covenant to waive a right for redress for future negligence." !d.
at 1382 (concurring opinion). No citation for this statement exists but it sounds similar to the
Jankele rule. This case has no precedential value with regard to exculpatory clauses, but it
illustrates the potential confusion surrounding exculpatory clauses.
44. 584 P.2d 823 (Utah 1978).
45. ld. at 826-827.
46. The problem with this assumption, however, is that the decision is pre-Freund and
Ericksen. No subsequent case exists either validating or invalidating exculpatory clauses in
Utah after Freund and Ericksen. Therefore, the law concerning exculpatory clauses is more
in question than that of indemnity clauses because it is unclear whether these rules apply.
47. 663 P.2d 433 (Utah 1983).
48. ld. at 433-434.
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sive. " 49 Although this clause was originally drafted as a liquidated
damages clause, 50 under the facts of the case the clause operated as a
limitation of damages clause because it does not fix liability between
parties for breach of contract, but for negligence. The court cited El
Paso as the rule for limitation of damages clauses, 51 stating that in El
Paso "this court refused to enforce a very detailed and thorough
exculpatory clause. " 52 The court proceeds to invalidate the clause under
the El Paso rule claiming that "[i]n the present case, the language
employed by the parties does not 'clearly and unequivocally' express an
intent to limit defendant's tort liability. " 53

D.

Application of Utah Case Law in the Federal Courts

The federal court cases provide an interesting twist on this analysis
as the district and circuit courts have attempted to apply Utah law.
Federal courts have addressed two types of clauses: releases and
indemnity clauses.

1.

Release Clauses

Only two federal district court cases address Utah law regarding
release clauses. Both post-Freund and Ericksen, but the cases do not
apply the standards from either case.
The first federal case is Zollman v. Myers. 54 In Zollman, a
snowmobile driver injured in an accident brought a negligence action
against the recreational park and the driver of the other snowmobile with
which she collided. 55 The rental agreement contained a clause that
released the park from any liability "even if they or any of them
negligently caused the bodily injury or property damage. "56 The
plaintiff advanced two arguments to invalidate the release: First, she

49. !d. at 437.
50. Liquidated damages clauses are invalidated or validated under different rules and will
not be discussed in this comment.
51. !d.
52. !d. This incorrect characterization of El Paso as an exculpatory clause, added to the
fact that the court never recognized the DCR clause as a limitation of damages clause, puts the
court's analysis and the applicability of the rule in question.
53. !d. at 438. Because this case is pre-Freund and Ericksen, the question of whether
those rules apply to limitation of damages clauses is unanswered. This case is the only
limitation of damages case in Utah analyzed under limited liability clause rules.
54. 797 F. Supp. 923 (D. Utah 1992).
55. !d.
56. !d. at 925 n.l.
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argued that this type of release is against public policy; 57 second, she
asserted that "release agreements are not favored in Utah law. " 58
The Zollman court did not accept the first argument which the
plaintiff based on a public policy statute regarding off-road vehicles. 59
However, the court accepted the second argument and found the clause
invalid. At the beginning of its analysis, the court cited El Paso60 but
made no further reference to it. Instead, the court rested its decision on
an ambiguity analysis based upon a clause in the contract that stated "I
hereby agree to stop my snowmobile and wait for proper instructions.
Otherwise, I expressly agree to assume the risk presented by the situation
or problem. " 61 The court declared that "if Zollman stops and awaits
instructions when encountering a hazardous situation, she does not
assume the risk of an accident. " 62 Thus, the court holds, this clause
conflicts with the "even if they or any of them negligently caused the
bodily injury or property damage" 63 statement. The court finds the
clause "ambiguous" under normal contract principles, not under the El
Paso rule. 64 Thus, it appears that courts will require that release clauses
be more than merely "clearly expressed" in order to avoid ambiguity.
Under the El Paso rule the clause may have been held unambiguous
because the clause contained reference to release the renter from his own

57. Id. at 926.
58. ld.
59. The plaintiff's public policy argument was that the Utah Code implicitly disallowed
release agreements for rental and training on off-road vehicles. The statute reads as follows:
It is the policy of this state to promote safety and protection for persons,
property, and the environment connected with the use, operation, and equipment of
off-highway vehicles, to promote uniformity of law, to adopt and pursue a safety
education program, and to develop trails and other facilities for the use of these
vehicles.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-22-1 (1991).
The court held that "the Act deals almost exclusively with the registration of and the
restrictions on the operation of off-highway vehicles, such as snowmobiles .... and in no place
suggests that parties providing such training cannot seek to limit their liability." Zollman, 797
F. Supp. at 926-927.
60. Zollman, 797 F. Supp. at 926 n.4.
61. !d. at 926 n.6.
62. !d. at 928.
63. ld. at 925 n.l.
64. See, ld. at 927-928. This opens the question of whether limited liability analysis
applies to release clauses in Utah. The opinion can be read many ways. First, the court might
not have followed the Freund rule because this was not a commercial contract with two parties
at arm's length. Normally, as in this case, the release language is found in a standard rental
form contract where the renter has no bargaining power, and usually does not even fully read
the contract. So, arguably, the Freund rule does not apply.
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negligence. 65 However, by citing El Paso's "not favored language, " 66
and using normal ambiguity principles, the federal district court came up
with a standard that is more strict than that which the Utah Supreme
Court applies. Under the federal court's holding, any ambiguity or
conflict with the release clause, even from other sections of the contract,
will invalidate the clause. This standard would invalidate many limited
liability clauses.
In the second case, Ghionis v. Deer Ullley Resort Co. ,67 a " [s]ki
equipment lessee brought [an] action against [the] lessor/operator of [a]
ski resort, alleging negligence ... in connection with a ski accident in
which she injured her knee. " 68 The court held that the release was
ambiguous and cited the El Paso standard in holding that: "[E]xculpatory
agreements are binding so long as they are clear and unequivocal in
expressing the parties' agreement to absolve a defendant of liability.
General language of release, however, without specificity as to the
shifting of responsibility is not enough to relieve a party at fault from
liability. " 69 However, the court continued, asserting that "[t]he Release
document is also ambiguous. " 7° Citing Zollman, the court held that
"like the release in Zollman the court finds the Deer Valley Release is

65. See, e.g., Freund v. Utah Power & Light Co., 793 P.2d 362, 370 (Utah 1990)
(implying that specific reference to exculpating one's negligence would pass the El Paso test);
Shell Oil Co. v. Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling Co., 658 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Utah 1983)(upholding
an indemnity clause that contained reference to indemnitee's negligence).
66. Zollman, 797 F. Supp. at 926.
67. 839 F. Supp. 789 (D. Utah 1993).
68. /d.
69. /d. at 793 (citations omitted). Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. First Security Corp., 341
P.2d 944 (Utah 1959), cited in Ghionis, is an exculpatory clause case decided before El Paso,
but it clearly uses a rule similar to the El Paso standard.
70. Ghionis, 839 F. Supp. at 793.
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ambiguous. " 71 Thus, it appears that, at the federal level at least,
Zollman can be considered a separate rule and will apply. 72
2.

Indemnity and Exculpatory Clauses

The federal courts have done a better job interpreting indemnity and
exculpatory clauses than release cases.73 In three cases from 1966 to
1971, the Tenth Circuit correctly applied the El Paso standard to validate
two clauses and to invalidate one. 74

71. /d. The ambiguity is created by conflict between paragraphs seven and ten.
Paragraph seven reads:
I hereby release the ski shop, and its owners, agents and employees from any and
all liability for damages and injury to myself or to any person or property resulting
from negligence, installation, maintenance, the selection, adjustment and use of this
equipment, accepting myself the full responsibility for any and all such damage or
injury which may result.
/d. at 792-93 n.2.
The court claims that this conflicts with paragraph ten, which reads: "All instructions on
the use of my rental equipment have been made clear to me, and I understand the function of
my equipment." /d. The court held that statement was untrue "[w]here those instructions are
lacking or deceptive, as is claimed by Ghionis on the compatibility of her boots and the ski
binding, the release clause of paragraph 7 does not apply." /d. at 794. This is quite a stretch
to find ambiguity. On their face the two paragraphs do not conflict; the only conflict was that
factually paragraph ten was not a true statement. The court implies the invalidation of
paragraph seven by way of paragraph ten.
72. In essence, the Zollman standard is that any ambiguity, or stretch of ambiguity will
invalidate the clause.
73. This may be because the indemnity and exculpatory clause cases were in the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals.
74. The federal district court also passed several decisions dealing with indemnity and
exculpatory clauses. For example, the federal district court followed the El Paso rule in a case
called Wollam v. Kennecott Corp. 663 F. Supp. 268 (D. Utah 1987). In Wollam, the court
invalidated a clause that had no reference to negligence. It stated that the "contract suffers
from the same lack of specificity found deficient in El Paso. The general language ... fails
expressly to state that Stockmar will indemnify Kennecott for Kennecott's negligence." /d. at
272.
After the 1990 Freund decision, the district court ignored Freund in CIG Exploration Inc.
v. Hill. 824 F. Supp. 1532 (D. Utah 1993). In that case, a "[g]as pipeline operator brought
[an] action seeking reimbursement from royalty interest owners of that portion of royalties
attributable to overcharges reimbursed to customers." /d. at 1532-33. Citing the El Paso rule
and several of its progeny, including the district court opinion of Freund, the court held that
the indemnity clause was invalid. /d. at 1541-42.
Under the El Paso rule, this decision properly held the clause invalid because it did not
contain specific language indemnify CIG from its own negligence. The problem with the
holding is that this is a commercial contract so the Freund rule should have applied. Under
the Freund rule, this clause would pass because it could "be 'clearly implied from the language,"' Freund v. Utah Power & Light Co., 793 P.2d 362,370 (Utah 1990), that CIG is to
be saved "harmless from and against any and all loss, cost, expense or damage it may suffer."
CIG Exploration, 824 F. Supp. at 1541. Thus, CIG can be read to imply that the Freund rule
is not valid, or that it is valid but this was not a commercial context with parties bargaining at
arm's length. The court made no statement one way or the other.
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In the first case, Titan Steel Corporation v. Walton/5 a general
contractor and owner sued for indemnity from a subcontractor whose
employee fell through a roof and died. 76 The clause contained the
language, "except when caused by the sole negligence of the Contractor
or Owner. " 77In addition to examining Utah law, the court recognizes a
federal view: "The federal view is that they [indemnity clauses] are
contrary to public policy, especially contracts affected with a public
interest and involving a public duty. " 78 The court then went on to apply
the El Paso clear-expression standard to validate the clause. 79
In the next case, United States Steel v. Warner, 80 a similar analysis
invalidated an exculpatory clause. In Warner, the plaintiff, an independent contractor, brought and action against the defendant for injuries
sustained from falling through a roof. The clause between the parties,
stated that the "safety of all persons ... shall be the sole responsibility
of the Contractor. " 81 The court correctly cited El Paso as the governing
rule and held that the provision was invalid. The court stated that "the
intent to relieve the defendant from its own negligence is not clearly and
unequivocally expressed."
Finally, in Southern Pacific Trans. Co. v. Nielsen, 82 the same court
again validated a indemnity clause. In Nielson, the railroad brought suit
against the purchaser of a railroad bridge for indemnification when one
of the purchaser's employees was killed. 83 The clause said that the
buyer would indemnify the railroad from all liability, "regardless of any
negligence or alleged negligence on the part of any Railroad employee or
agent. " 84 The Tenth Circuit, in three decisions, cited El Paso and
carefully maneuvered its way through Utah law to validate the clause
because it specifically included the railroad's negligence.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

365 F.2d 542 (lOth Cir. 1966).
/d.

/d. at 548.
!d. This rule is similar to thelankele rule found in the old exculpatory clause cases.
!d. at 548-49.
378 F.2d 995 (lOth Cir. 1967).
/d. at 999 (alterations in original).
448 F.2d 121 (lOth Cir. 1971).
/d. at 121-122.
/d. at 122.
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The Special Exception: Indemnity Clauses in Construction
Contracts and Design Professionals

Construction Contracts

A construction contract commonly includes indemnity clauses. The
Utah legislature has decided that in these contracts indemnity provisions
are void as against public policy. The Utah Code states:
A covenant, promise, agreement or understanding in, or in
connection with or collateral to, a contract or agreement relative to the
construction, alteration, repair or maintenance of a building, structure,
highway, appurtenance and appliance, including moving, demolition and
excavating connected therewith, purporting to indemnify the promisee
against liability for damages arising out of bodily injury to persons or
damage to property caused by or resulting from the sole negligence of
the promisee, his agents or employees, or indemnitee, is against public
policy and is void and unenforceable.
This act will not be construed to affect or impair the obligations of
contracts or agreements, which are in existence at the time the act
becomes effective. 85

This is a special exception to the rules outlined above and the clause only
qualifies if the contract is for construction. The indemnity clause limits
damages for physical injury or property damage and the limits liability
for indemnitee's sole negligence. If these conditions exist, the clause is
void. 86 Many contracts get around this obstacle with an "except for the
sole negligence of indemnity" clause. 87 With this clause the contract
and its indemnity provision will be upheld. 88

85. UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-8-1 (1991).
86. See, e.g., Jacobsen Constr. Co. v. Blaine Constr., 863 P.2d 1329 (Utah Ct. App.
1993), appeal dismissed, 878 P.2d 1151 (Utah 1994); Wollam v. Kennecott Corp. 663 F.Supp
268 (D. Utah 1987).
87. See, e.g., Scudder v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 858 P.2d 1005 (Utah App.
1993)("excluding any liability caused by sole negligence or willful misconduct of Owner or
Manager."), rev 'd 886 P.2d 49 (Utah 1994)(reversing on grounds unrelated to the indemnification agreement); Shell Oil Co. v. Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling Co., 658 P.2d 1187, 1189 n.l
(Utah 1983)("except where such injury, death or damage has resulted from the sole negligence
of Operator."); Titan Steel Corp. v. Walton, 365 F.2d 542, 548 (lOth Cir. 1966)("except when
caused by the sole negligence of the Contractor or Owner."); cf Southern Pacific Trans. Co.
v. Nielsen, 448 F.2d 121, 122 (lOth Cir. 197l)("regardless of any negligence or alleged
negligence on the part of any Railroad employee or agent.").
88. See, e.g., Scudder v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 858 P.2d 1005 (Utah App.
1993)("excluding any liability caused by sole negligence or willful misconduct of Owner or
Manager."), rev 'd 886 P .2d 49 (Utah 1994)(reversing on grounds unrelated to the indemnification agreement); Shell Oil Co. v. Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling Co., 658 P.2d 1187, 1189 n.l
(Utah 1983)("except where such injury, death or damage has resulted from the sole negligence
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Design Professionals

A design professional is defined as "an architect, engineer, or land
surveyor. It includes any other person who, for a fee or other compensation, performs services similar to the services of an architect, engineer,
or land surveyor in connection with the development of land. "89
A contract for services performed by design professionals may not
limit the design professional's or landowner's liability to either the
contractor or subcontractor. 90 This rule does not apply if the design
professional is also hired to construct the project91 and no exception
exists for clauses that exempt sole negligence. 92 Thus, this restriction
is more rigid that the construction industry rule.

of Operator."); Titan Steel Corp. v. Walton, 365 F.2d 542, 548 (lOth Cir. 1966)("except when
caused by the sole negligence of the Contractor or Owner."); cf. Southern Pacific Trans. Co.
v. Nielsen, 448 F.2d 121, 122 (lOth Cir. 1971)("regardless of any negligence or alleged
negligence on the part of any Railroad employee or agent.").
89. UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-8-2(1)(c) (1991).
90. The relevant statute states:
(2) An agreement between an owner and a contractor may not limit the owner's or
a design professional's liability to the contractor for any claim arising from services
performed by the design professional in connection with the development of land.
This subsection does not apply if the owner and the contractor are the same person
or entity or ar controlled by the same person or entity.
(3) An agreement between a contractor and a subcontractor may not limit the
owner's or a design professional's liability to the subcontractor for any claim arising
from services performed by the design professional in connection with the development of land.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-8-2(2)-(3) (1991).
91. UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-8-2(4) (1991) states: "This section does not apply if the
design professional is retained under a single contract to perform both the design and the
construction of the project, such as in a design-build or turn-key project."
92. The statute gives no exceptions:
(2) An agreement between an owner and a contractor may not limit the owner's or
a design professional's liability to the contractor for any claim arising from services
performed by the design professional in connection with the development of land.
This subsection does not apply if the owner and the contractor are the same person
or entity or ar controlled by the same person or entity.
(3) An agreement between a contractor and a subcontractor may not limit the
owner's or a design professional's liability to the subcontractor for any claim arising
from services performed by the design professional in connection with the development of land.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-8-2(2)-(3) (1991).
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Limiting Liability Clause in Fraud Cases

The majority rule for limiting liability clauses in fraud cases is that
"[a] term unreasonably exempting a party from the legal consequences of
a misrepresentation is unenforceable on grounds of public policy. " 93
The Utah Supreme Court applied this majority rule to a limitation of
damages clause in a case called Lamb v. Bangart. 94 In Lamb, a
purchaser brought an action for breach of warranty and fraud against the
sellers of a livestock breading contract. The issues were whether a clause
limiting the purchaser's damages to " [e]xoneration of the final payment
... and tender of one half of the [bull's] semen" 95 was valid in a fraud
action. The court held that "a contract clause limiting liability will not
be applied in a fraud action" and further "[a] contract limitation on
damages or remedies is valid only in the absence of allegation or proof
of fraud. " 96 An old New York case, Bridger v. Goldsmith, 97 gives an
especially clear explanation of the rationale behind this rule:
[T]here is no authority we are required to follow in support of the
proposition that a party who has perpetrated a fraud upon his neighbor
may nevertheless contract with him, in the very instrument by means of
which it was perpetrated, for immunity against its consequences, close
his mouth from complaining of it, and bind him never to seek redress.
Public policy and morality are both ignored if such an agreement can
be given effect in a court of justice. The maxim that fraud vitiates every
transaction would no longer be the rule, but the exception. It could be
applied then only in such case as the guilty party neglected to protect
himself from his fraud by means of such a stipulation. Such a principle
would in a short time break down every barrier which the law has
erected against fraudulent dealing. 98

Therefore, if a clause at issue in a fraud action bars liability completely
or limits damages, it is invalid.
The rule in Lamb was cited and upheld in a 1993 case, Ong
International (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Avenue Corporation. 99 There, a
release between the partners "forever discharge[d] SLMM [defendant],
its agents, officers and employees from any and all claims, demands,

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §

525 P.2d 602 (Utah 1974).
/d. at 608.
/d.
38 N.E. 458 (N.Y. 1894).
/d. at 459.
850 P.2d 447 (Utah 1993).

196 (1965).
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rights of action or causes of action." 100 The court cited Lamb and held
that "[t]he law does not permit a covenant of immunity which will protect
a person against his own fraud on the ground of public policy. A
contract limitation on damages or remedies is valid only in the absence
of allegations or proof of fraud. " 101 No confusion exists in this area of
limited liability clauses. They are simply not valid in the face of fraud.

G.

Summary

As outlined above, the case law in Utah raises creates several
standards for limited liability clauses. Below are the possible rules and
their relationship to each other:
Ericksen rule: Clause is
sufficiently broadl02

< ---Strict-------------------------------- I----------------------------Lenient--- >
Janke/e-Federal

Zollman rule: any

E1 Paso rule: clear

Freund rule: im-

Majority rule:

rule: void, against

conflict or am-

& equivocal ex-

plied from langua-

valid unless emp-

public policy,

biguity, releas-

pression, specific,

ge, purpose of a-

Ioyer or charged

exculpatory claus-

es?J04

covers negligence,

greement, sur-

with public ser-

indemnity,

rounding facts, for

vice (all

exculpatory? limi-

conunercial, arms

types)'o'

tation of da-

length transac-

es.wl

mages. lOS

tions , indemnity?
exculpatory?
limitation of damages?I06

100. /d. at 451 (citing Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602 (Utah 1974)).
101. /d. at 452.
102. Ericksen v. Salt Lake City Corp., 858 P.2d 995 (Utah 1993).
103. See Allen v. Southern Pac. Co., 213 P.2d 667 (Utah 1950); Jankele v. Texas Co.,
54 P.2d 425, 427 (Utah 1936); Titan Steel Corp. v. Walton, 365 F.2d 542 (lOth Cir. 1966).
See also Boise Cascade Corp. v Stephens, 572 P.2d 1380, 1382 (Utah 1977); K.A. Drechsler,
Annotation, Limiting Liability for Own Negligence, 175 A.L.R. 8, 14 (1927).
104. See Ghionis v. Deer Valley Resort Co., 839 F. Supp. 789 (D. Utah 1993); Zollman
v. Myers, 797 F. Supp. 923 (D. Utah 1992).
105. See DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433 (Utah 1983)(limitation of damages
clause); Howe Rent Corp. v. Worthen, 420 P.2d 848 (Utah 1966)(exculpatory clause); Union
Pacific R.R. Co. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 408 P.2d 910 (Utah 1965)(indemnity clause).
106. Freund v. Utah Power & Light Co., 793 P.2d 362 (Utah 1990).
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 195 (1965).
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DRAFT A LIMITED LIABILITY CLAUSE

THAT WILL PASS THE SCRUTINY OF THE COURT

Understanding the intricacies involved in Utah limited liability clause
cases is essential to properly drafting a valid clause. Each holding must
be taken into consideration when drafting the clause, especially in light
of the fact that a clause could end up being used for a different purpose
depending on how the controversy arises. 108 In spite of this potential,
however, it is possible to draft a limited liability clause that will pass the
scrutiny of the court.
The best rule to drafting a valid clause would be to draft it so that it
would pass the most strict rule that courts have used, even if the rule
does not directly apply to the type of clause being drafted. The Jankele
rule is the strictest and voids any clause limiting liability, making it
impossible to draft a clause that would pass this standard. 109 The next
standard is the Zollman rule. 110 Under Zollman, any potential conflict
or ambiguity between the clause and other parts of the contract will
invalidate the clause. Drafting a clause without these conflicts can be
difficult with a large contract where many provisions could potentially
conflict with the clause in question. The drafter must review the whole
contract for conflicts or ambiguities using Zollman and Ghionis as
examples."'
The next standard is the El Paso rule. This standard requires that the
parties clearly and unequivocally state their intentions to exculpate one
party's negligence. The rule specifically requires that the clause clearly
state that one party is exculpating the other party from its own negligence. The clause in Nielsen is an excellent example of one that will
pass the scrutiny of the court. This clause states that "regardless of any
negligence or alleged negligence on the part of any . . . employee or
agent. " 112
While the Nielson clause passes the El Paso text, it would be found
invalid under the Utah statute if it appeared in a construction con-

108. For example, a clause drafted to indemnify one party could end up being used as an
exculpatory clause if a conflict arises between the contracting parties.
109. See Allen v. Southern Pac. Co., 213 P.2d 667 (Utah 1950); Jankele v. Texas Co.,
54 P.2d 425, 427 (Utah 1936); Titan Steel Corp. v. Walton, 365 F.2d 542 (lOth Cir. 1966).
See also Boise Cascade Corp. v. Stephens, 572 P.2d 1380, 1382 (Utah 1977); K.A. Drechsler,
Annotation, Limiting Liability for Own Negligence, 175 A.L.R. 8, 12 (1927).
110. See Ghionis v. Deer Valley Resort Co., 839 F. Supp. 789 (D. Utah 1993); Zollman
v. Myers, 797 F. Supp. 923 (D. Utah 1992).
111. See Ghionis, 839 F. Supp. 789; Zollman, 797 F. Supp. 923.
112. Southern Pacific Trans. Co. v. Nielsen, 448 F.2d 121, 122 (lOth Cir. 1971).
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tract. 113 For construction contracts, an appropriate clause is one similar
to the clause in Shell Oil. A construction clause should include language
to the effect that liability will not exist "except where such injury, death
or damage has resulted from the sole negligence of Operator. " 114
These clauses will pass the El Paso standard.
The final standard is the Ericksen rule. Under Ericksen, the clause
must be sufficiently broad to cover any situation that may arise. Because
the situation is not known to the parties at the time they draft the clause,
the Ericksen standard is difficult to meet. A clause that limits any and
all liability from any and all possible parties should generally meet this
standard. 115
In conclusion, a clause that meets the Zollman, El Paso, and Ericksen
standards will meet the more lenient Freund or majority rules. Drafting
a clause to meet the requirements of these rules will allow the clause to
pass the scrutiny of Utah courts.

Trey Dayes

113.
114.
1983).
115.
Ericksen

UTAH CODE ANN. 13-8-1 (1991).
Shell Oil Co. v. Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling Co., 658 P.2d 1187, 1189 n.l. (Utah

The clause in Ericksen fell short because it missed any employees of the city.
v. Salt Lake City Corp., 858 P.2d 995, 998 (Utah 1993).

